



Spontaneous and Ad-hoc Volunteers Integration Toolkit

Tabletop Game Scenarios Booklet

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Scenario 1: Floods in Rozenburg, Rotterdam (The Netherlands)



Severe riverine and coastal flooding has repeatedly threatened the Rotterdam-Rijnmond region due to its position at the confluence of rivers, below sea level. In addition, the area concentrates critical industrial infrastructure, densely built residential zones, and vulnerable pockets isolated by waterways and access constraints. Authorities and operational actors in the safety region are well-prepared for flood events, with tested escalation protocols, pre-positioned response capacity and close cooperation with water boards. However, surge conditions can overload coordination capacity and disrupt communication infrastructure, leaving gaps in the preparation for, response to and recovery from such events.

This scenario invites you to explore three critical moments in a flooding event where actions of the population (individual and collective) intersect with formal emergency response. It focuses on how informal aid can complement, complicate, or conflict with official operations, and what this means for preparedness and coordination. Through such scenario, the game's objective is to support discussions on the issue of the integration of informal aid and exploration of potential approaches (tools, recommendations, methods) that we have collected in various parts of the world.

→ Rozenburg neighbourhood

Season and weather: Late autumn / winter storm period, severe riverine flood following sustained rainfall upstream.

Population Affected: Approx. 14,000 residents in a compact urban core.

Geographical and infrastructural context:

- Peninsula-like area **surrounded by water and with limited access routes** (few bridges and roads)
- Low-lying polder landscape, **high dependency on dike integrity**
- The Waterschap monitoring system provides technical early warning, but translating this into actionable, trusted public communication is a known challenge
- **Close proximity to major industrial facilities** (e.g., refineries such as Gunvor) with cascading risk potential

Social and community context:

- Mixed socio-economic profile of the population, with significant share of working-class households and a proportion of migrant workers employed in the port sector
- Language diversity (Dutch, Polish, Romanian, Turkish, Arabic, English)
- Local identity and **strong informal networks** (communities, clubs, associations)
- Presence of **self-organised volunteer culture** (e.g., boat clubs, neighbours)
- **Varying risk awareness:** some experienced with flooding risks, others unaware or unworried due to infrastructure and management of flood risk

Stage 2: Warning

72-24 hours before flood

Forecasts show an increasingly severe storm surge combined with high upstream river levels (floods are ongoing in Limburg). Authorities warn of **exceptional water levels**, and inspections reveal **weaknesses in dikes near Rozenburg**.

Central concerns

- Uncertainty: “Will it really flood?”
- **Information overload vs. lack of clarity** (conflicting messages)
- Limited capacity of authorities to respond to all citizen inquiries
- Risk of early **self-evacuation causing congestion**
- Preparedness gap between households

Actions of formal actors

- Safety region activates planning staff and prepares evacuation and sheltering options
- Water board intensifies dike monitoring and reinforcement planning. It alerts Safety Region about dike weaknesses: engineers are deployed for on-site reinforcement
- Red Cross and Ready2Help prepare mobilisation and communication, check inventories
- Public communication increases (websites, alerts, media)

Actions of the population and other informal actors

- Residents actively seek, share, and interpret risk information through social media and messaging groups
- Some households stockpile food, water, and fuel, causing crowded shops and low stock of essential products – tensions are even reported
- Early voluntary evacuation begins. In particular, people with vulnerable relatives or neighbours begin organising informal convoys to transport them out.
- Others remain sceptical or delay action
- Spontaneous offers of help (e.g., reinforcing dikes, hosting relatives)

Stages 3-5: DURING phase

Day of flooding: 08:00–16:00

At 08:00, dikes are declared critically weak; by 09:00, a breach causes rapid flooding of Rozenburg. Within hours, cascading risks emerge, including hazardous industrial incident (toxic substance release risk), potential electricity failures, saturation or failure of communication networks. By 13:00, a refinery reports danger of air dispersion of toxic and corrosive substances (gas, liquid mist, solid particles), affecting Rozenburg.

Central concerns

- Immediate life safety and evacuation under time pressure
- Overloaded communication systems
- Access constraints due to flooding and limited roads
- Rising panic and uncertainty
- Conflicting instructions: evacuate vs shelter indoors (industrial hazard)
- Language barriers make emergency communication difficult

Actions of formal actors

- Escalation to second level of crisis coordination structure, deployment of fire brigade, police, Red Cross, Ready2Help
- Initially, emergency evacuation of vulnerable populations begins
- Activation of NL-Alert and sirens (shelter-in-place orders during toxic release risk)
- Active communication towards aid workers (volunteers or professionals) and their relatives about a possible changing course of action

Actions of the population and other informal actors

- Spontaneous evacuation attempts by car or on foot
- Residents help each other moving valuables to upper floors, assisting elderly or vulnerable neighbours
- Requests for information flood the RC helpline
- Large amounts of information exchange about flooding in local Facebook groups. Some people are confused about evacuation or about where to go – others provide information they have
- Information about dikes is shared in media, people have started to converge to the site: local boat owners attempt water-based rescues, citizens converge toward dike breach or affected zones

Stage 7: Recovery

1–3 days after

Floodwaters begin to stabilize, but the area remains heavily disrupted. Some areas still do not receive electricity, nor water. Industrial consequences are mostly under control, but contamination and debris are present in the flood water. At this point, large numbers of external volunteers are starting to arrive to help.

Central concerns

- Coordination of massive spontaneous aid
- Safety risks in damaged and contaminated areas
- Unequal distribution of help and resources
- Fatigue and emotional stress
- Transition from emergency response to organised recovery

Actions of formal actors

- Damage assessment and securing unsafe zones
- Restoration of utilities and infrastructure
- Organisation of shelters and social support
- Gradual structuring of volunteer involvement
- Risk communication about hazards (pollution, structural damage)

Actions of the population and other informal actors

- Hundreds of volunteers arrive for clean-up operations
- Donations of food, clothes, and materials flood the area
- Local contractors and skilled residents assist with heavy equipment and repairs
- Informal mutual aid networks support displaced residents
- Volunteers helping are complaining about exhaustion, some break down emotionally

Scenario 2: Tropical cyclone in La Réunion (France)



Welcome to Reunion Island!

A magnificent living environment, a paradise for visitors...

... but also 7 of the 8 main natural hazards identified at the national level, and a diverse population that is changing, vulnerable people, communities in a situation of social precariousness or geographically isolated, etc.



Among the hazards to which Reunion Island is exposed, the cyclone risk is well integrated into local institutions (authorities, scientific bodies, media, etc.) and practices. Most of the population is also aware of the right necessary preparedness or containment measures. Despite a general preparation repeated every year, recent events such as Belal or Garance remind us that cyclones are particularly destructive and dangerous phenomena, which impact the population, homes, infrastructure, etc.

Faced with the magnitude of the impact of such phenomena, the public authorities and other formal actors participating in the management of cyclones cannot, on their own, respond to all the emergencies and needs around the territory. Before, during and after a cyclone, informal acts of mutual aid occur and make it possible to relieve difficult situations while waiting for formal help (which is sometimes long). As we see in other regions of the world, and for other types of events, this informal aid is a strength, is often necessary to reduce the impact of disasters, but can also be ineffective due to a lack of resources or coordination or even pose certain risks (limitations often due to the fact that informal aid remains "invisible" and poorly documented).

Stage 2: Warning

H-48, Early warning phase: St-Denis, La Bretagne neighbourhood

Tropical storm KANTO has been forecast for a few days and is approaching Reunion Island. Météo France forecasts indicate a probable impact on the island within 48 hours, and a strengthening of the phenomenon into a tropical cyclone within 24 hours.

Central concerns

- Vast and heterogeneous area, locally densely inhabited, with social mix, active neighbourhood networks
- Exposure to strong winds
- Frequent water/electricity cuts
- Risk of localised flooding (urban runoff, gullies)
- Water, food, fuel supply
- Fear of a major cyclone and recent memories (Belal, Garance)
- Uncertainties, particularly among the population, about the exact trajectory and intensity: anxiety, circulation of rumours

Actions of formal actors

- Based on weather forecast, and in consultation with the various stakeholders, the Prefecture is preparing to implement the orange alert
- The Prefecture communicates via media and social networks (official alerts, preparation instructions)
- Municipalities activated their crisis units and prepared the accommodation centres
- Technical services check networks, possible preventive power cuts

Actions of the population and other informal actors

- Massive purchases in supermarkets (water, candles, canned goods) – tensions are observed in some stores, some (minor) incidents are relayed on social networks.
- Some families fill freezers and fridges.
- Families reinforce their houses (closing shutters, securing objects).
- Neighbours exchange practical information: "which stations still have gas?", "who has a generator?", "who has plywood?"
- On social networks (WhatsApp, Facebook, comments on news sites), information circulates and some false rumours spread.
- Neighbours help Ms. Hoareau, 78, nail plywood planks to her windows.
- A local shopkeeper updates on Facebook the availability of essential products (bread, batteries).
- A young man offers his car to transport several families to a shelter if the alert worsens.

Stage 4: Arrival of formal actors

H+12: Blue phase: La Providence neighbourhood (Saint-Denis)

KANTO strengthened and became a category 1 tropical cyclone that came very close to the coast of the island. The island was on red alert for a few hours, but the purple alert was not necessary. As the phenomenon recedes, the alert phase changes to blue.

The strongest winds, recorded in the upper parts of the island, reached about 150km/h and did not cause significant damage, apart from various impacts of falling branches on some homes and on the electricity network.

On the other hand, the meteor generated new record rainfall over the north and east of the island, triggering sudden swelling of gullies, significant flooding in some areas (including urban areas), landslides and scree in the fragile areas (e.g. cirque roads).

The Providence neighbourhood is very affected by the overflow of the Butor river.

Central concerns

- Urban area with high density, already marked by social vulnerabilities and historical flooding.
- Flooded homes, garbage and mud everywhere.
- Risk of feeling abandoned and tensions if help is delayed.

Actions of formal actors

- Firefighters and gendarmes organized reconnaissance in the neighborhoods, the mud and various debris (including car wrecks) made traffic and access to the emergency services difficult.
- The town hall activates its municipal services to organise the cleaning of roads.
- The prefecture anticipates and organizes the sending of reinforcements (medical, supplies).

Actions of the population and other informal actors

- Neighbors are organizing to empty houses, take out damaged furniture.
- Some families lost their food and water supplies in the flood. Collective kitchens are improvised (meals shared with available resources).
- Local associations (e.g. youth collectives) relay the specific needs of the neighbourhood on social networks.
- Organization of cleaning teams, "helping hand" between families.
- A person is missing by a neighbour, perhaps swept away by the waters, a group has formed to look for them downstream.
- Residents help a neighbour in a situation of psychological shock in the face of the damage to his apartment.
- Two people slightly injured by debris are being treated by neighbors who have some medical equipment.

Stage 7: Recovery

D+2, Backup, cleaning and reconstruction phase: Grand-Ilet, Salazie

The access road to Grand-Ilet was cut off by two large scree due to the rains.

Electricity and water distribution networks have also been more severely affected in this region of the island and are currently interrupted. Communication infrastructure (e.g. cell towers) is damaged or impacted by the loss of electricity, access to communication networks is generally poor and disrupted.

Central concerns

- Landlocked area, fragile road access, frequent isolation after cyclones, strong local solidarity.
- Difficulties in accessing relief and supplies – the population's concern about immediate needs, but also in the longer term
- Drinking water not available.
- Possible injuries not yet treated.
- Accumulation of waste that has not been disposed of.
- Fear of being "forgotten" by the emergency services.

Actions of formal actors

- The municipal services organise the cleaning of roads.
- Firefighters and gendarmes are trying to reopen roads, aerial reconnaissance by helicopter.
- The Prefecture is coordinating the arrival of reinforcements (medical, supplies).
- ONF and army initiated major works (ravines, roads).
- Relief associations are preparing to distribute meals and hygiene kits.
- EDF/Veolia are working to restore the networks (long delays possible).

Actions of the population and other informal actors

- Sharing food and water between neighbours.
- Word of mouth replaces internet/mobile cut.
- A few young people on mountain bikes and motorcycle manage to bypass the road blocked by the scree to exchange some information and resources with neighbouring villages.
- Members of the village are clearing paths with shovels to restore access.
- Local associations come to help the ONF and the army to clear the roads and paths.
- The inhabitants organize a community room as an improvised care station: Mrs. Payet, a retired nurse, dresses the wounded with her personal stock.

Scenario 3: Earthquake in Malta



Context of Malta

- **Exposure to natural risks** on the islands: seismic activity, heavy rains and floods
- **Building infrastructure:** varying degrees of seismic design (typically absent of low-to-medium buildings)
- **Population:**
 - Very dense, diverse languages, large proportion of foreign population (including temporary: tourists and migrants)
 - Varying degrees of risk awareness in the population
- **Essential resources:**
 - Fresh water is scarce: production is based on groundwater extraction and desalination
 - Some food is produced locally in significant quantities (most vegetables, eggs, milk), but relies on import for a large part (meat, potatoes)

Stage 2: Warning

Situation

Significant tremors are felt on the islands on 27 and 28 April 2025.

Residents of Regjun Tramuntana experience subtle yet unsettling signs. Minor tremors, registering between magnitude 3.0 and 4.0, are felt across localities such as Mosta, Mgarr, and Mellieħa. These tremors cause chandeliers to sway gently and unsettle pets, but they are largely dismissed by the public as inconsequential.

Key concerns

- Tremors are not rare in the area

Actions of formal actors

- No warning message issued by authorities
- Small reports in media

Actions of informal actors

- Most of the population sees tremors as inconsequential
- Some members of the population contact emergency organisations to know more
- Exchanges of information occur on social platforms

Stage 3: Immediate emergency

H0 – H6: Immediate impact in Mgarr

At 09:45 AM on April 30, 2025, a powerful earthquake of 7.4 magnitude strikes. Its epicentre is located approximately 20 km northeast of Malta. The ground shakes violently for about 30 seconds.

The tremors are felt across Regjun Tramuntana, **leading to buildings collapse, immediate infrastructural damage. Power lines are downed, water mains burst, and roads crack open. Communication networks are disrupted**

In Mgarr, rural village of about 5,000 inhabitants, as in the rest of the region, the streets become scenes of chaos and desperation as buildings tremble and some collapse.

Key concerns

- Damage to all infrastructures, including communication blackout
- Low awareness
- Victims in collapsed structures

Actions of formal actors

- Emergency personnel from the closest fire stations and hospitals cannot reach Mgarr due to the impact on the road infrastructure
- No communication can be established with the local authorities

Actions of informal actors

- After the initial minutes of fear and shock, people start searching for victims, quickly extracting a number of people who were close to the surface of the rubbles
- Parents try to rush by foot to the local primary school searching for their children, all meeting at the school inquire about friends and family

Stage 4: Arrival of formal actors

H6 – H24: in Mġarr

- The roads are mostly unusable and require special vehicles
- Airport damage remains limited but the runway is unusable for aircrafts
- Cell networks not functional in most of Malta

Key concerns

- Management of wounded and deceased
- People still entrapped in rubbles

Actions of formal actors

- Fly over by helicopter to assess
- Fire brigade with 4WD reaches the village, conducts search and rescue
- Use of radio communication between emergency responders
- National authorities request help from ERCC

Actions of informal actors

- Community members use farm equipment to clear up main roads
- Members of the population organise a victim collection point; people with first-aid knowledge help victims
- People on motorbikes, bicycles or foot reach nearby towns and share news and information

Stage 5: formal response

J1 – J5: in St Paul's Bay

In Malta, the main large roads are usable, but highly congested. Power and communication are reestablished in main cities, but water provision is still unavailable.

In the dense and highly touristic urban environment of St Paul's Bay, stocks of basic items in supermarkets are very low and quickly disappearing. The Good Samaritan Hospital is too damaged and inaccessible from city streets. The Mater Dei Hospital nearby is functioning but operating much beyond capacity.

Key concerns

- Taking care of the wounded
- Search and rescue to find survivors
- Housing, drinking water and food for the population

Actions of formal actors

- Search for victims, treat victims
- Reestablish main roads further, power
- Municipality organizes a communication "hub" in Buggiba square
- At J3: European CP agencies and military support arrive
- Temporary medical facilities are established in gymnasiums, open spaces, lack essential personnel and equipment

Actions of informal actors

- Local residents establish lists of people unaccounted for
- People attempt to enter buildings to search for valuables (e.g., papers)
- A radio association sets up a network for communication across the islands
- A 4WD association organises trips to agricultural areas for food and information exchanges
- A diving club transports people and essential supplies along the coast
- Restaurants and hotels establish emergency kitchens
- People from unaffected areas arrive to offer help in cleaning rubbles
- A group of retired nurses arrives at the hospital to offer help
- Some tourists offer to help with translation needs and with identifying missing persons

Stage 6: Departure of formal actors

J5 – J20: Stabilisation on the islands

Power outage and issues with water supply are still frequent. The airport is partially reopened, usable by military transport aircraft but not by regular commercial flights.

Key concerns

- Everyday life in highly degraded conditions
- General situation of the medical system

Actions of formal actors

- The Civil Protection establishes additional temporary tents for housing, field hospitals, water and food distribution and leaves at J20
- Transport helicopters bring troops and equipment via Sicily
- Most roads are cleared
- The Red Cross receives massive amounts of food and supplies donations, and organizes transport

Actions of informal actors

- Populations in Europe are alerted through social media
- Boat shuttles are organized to Malta with volunteers and supplies
- A shipping company proposes to carry containers and stop on their route
- Civil engineering professors and student from the university start exploring the cities and assessing buildings, marking those questionable with paint. A computer student creates a map of buildings already assessed.
- Groups on social media (WhatsApp, Facebook) form to exchange services
- Ferry companies organise shuttle of tourists to nearby unaffected countries

Stage 7: Longer-term recovery

J20 - ...

Key concerns

- Clean-up
- Reestablishing infrastructure
- Rebuilding
- Departure of volunteers

Actions of formal actors

- Work on reestablishing main infrastructure: water infrastructure (desalination, treatment, distribution), airport, harbours
- Discussions on reconstruction are starting, with a particular focus on cultural heritage

Actions of informal actors

- Community self-help is a major contributor to clean-up efforts
- People exchange on social media about reconstruction priorities
- People who have been volunteering for days reach hospitals in state of exhaustion and despair

Scenario 4: Severe winter blackout in Tallinn (Estonia)



Severe winter weather in Estonia, including heavy snow, strong winds, and storms repeatedly causes regional power outages as falling trees and damaged overhead lines disrupt the electricity network. These outages affect tens of thousands of households, disrupt key services, increase pressure on grid repair crews and emergency services, with authorities prioritising power restoration to critical facilities.

Formal actors in Estonia are relatively well prepared for such events (e.g., legal and institutional frameworks, multi-agency exercises, planning across levels). However, assessments also highlight capacity gaps (e.g., adaptation to increasingly complex and cascading risks): preparedness is solid but still evolving rather than complete. While many people are *aware* of emergency guidance, only a minority are truly prepared in practice. People in large apartment buildings are especially less likely to be ready.

In worst cases, when outages coincide with severe weather, public authorities and other formal response actors may be unable to address all emergencies and needs across the affected area. In such situations, informal acts of mutual aid often emerge, helping to alleviate immediate hardships while formal assistance is being mobilised. This informal aid is a strength, is often necessary to reduce the impact of disasters, but can also be ineffective due to a lack of resources or coordination or even pose certain risks.

→ Cold Silence in Lasnamäe district

Season and weather: January, arctic cold spell, -25 °C to -30 °C sustained for more than 2 weeks

Population Affected: Approx. 120,000 residents in multiple microdistricts

Housing Context:

- Soviet-era large-panel apartment blocks (9–16 floors, poor building quality, poor insulation).
- District heating, electrically powered pumps and elevators.
- Heating circulation and water pressure depend on electricity in apartment blocks

Social Context:

- High proportion of elderly residents, Russian-speaking and immigrant population prevails, Socio-economically low status prevails.
- Russian-speaking population tend not to follow Estonian official media.
- Relatively inactive neighbourhood networks

A severe Arctic cold spell coincides with a cascading failure in the regional electricity grid. Several high-density apartment blocks lose power completely. Heating, elevators, water pumps, telecommunications repeaters, and electronic access systems fail. Backup generators are limited and fuel supply chains are stressed.

Within 24–48 hours, indoor temperatures drop below survivable levels. Vulnerable populations (elderly, children, disabled, chronically ill) face immediate life-threatening conditions. Authorities must initiate large-scale evacuation to heated shelters while managing transport, medical needs, and public order in extreme weather.

Stage 2: Warning

72-24 hours before outage

The risk of severe Arctic cold spell combined with a cascading failure in the regional electricity grid is a major hazard that Estonia and Tallinn, including Lasnamäe are faced with. Meteorological services forecast an extreme cold spell 3–5 days in advance. Power utilities warn of high grid stress and possible rolling blackouts. No immediate outage yet, but risk is escalating.

Central concerns

- Very few people have full preparedness kits (water, food, candles, radios with batteries) (Emor, 2025)
- Only some apartment blocks have generators as a backup for power outages.
- Difficulties in reaching Russian-speaking or immigrant populations with official warnings or guidance
- Risk scepticism among the population. Disbelief in official risk communication and guidance.

Actions of formal actors

- Estonian Weather Service issues official weather warning for extreme cold on its official channels and websites
- Based on weather forecast, and in consultation with the various stakeholders including Estonian Rescue Board, the city government activates crisis coordination unit
- ERB gives guidance to population on how to prepare for extreme cold
- In a severe case, warnings are integrated into public alerting and crisis communication systems (e.g. EE-ALARM)
- Tallinn city government issues practical local instructions
- Tallinn city government prepares evacuation centres/resilience centres

Actions of the population and other informal actors

- On social networks messages spread claiming official warnings as false predictions and unnecessary scaring of the public
- Some word-of mouth spreading of warning message to immigrant and Russian-speaking communities
- Only a few people prepare their households (buy tents and sleeping bags)
- Mobile electric generators, fuel and shelter supplies?
- Update lists of vulnerable persons?
- Authorities ask housing associations to check technical readiness

Stage 5: Response

Power outage, heating failure, mass evacuation

During the second night of extreme cold, a cascading failure in the electricity grid causes a complete power outage across several parts of Lasnamäe. District heating circulation stops. Elevators halt mid-rise and high-rise buildings. Water pressure drops sharply above the 4th–5th floors.

Within 12 hours, indoor temperatures fall below +10 °C. By 24 hours, many apartments reach dangerously cold conditions. Emergency calls increase sharply. Ambulances report delays due to the magnitude of the impact on persons in need and icy roads.

Tallinn City Government, in coordination with the Rescue Board (Päästeamet), orders a partial mass evacuation of the most affected buildings. Heated shelters are opened in schools, sports halls, and community centres in other districts. Public transport is redirected to support evacuation, but capacity is limited.

Central concerns

- Apartment blocks with hundreds of inhabitants are in normal times marked by social vulnerabilities (low income, low trust in authorities).
- Apartments are quickly cooling down, no electricity, no water or sewage.
- In evacuation shelters, space and supplies are limited.
- Mobile networks are overloaded or partially down leading to difficulties in receiving information from authorities and difficulties in requesting for assistance
- Healthcare system under surge pressure
- Public transport limited by cold-related mechanical failures
- Falls and injuries in dark stairwells and streets.
- Carbon monoxide poisoning from improvised fires
- Panic and psychological stress, amplified by language barriers
- Tensions occur between some residents and formal rescue as residents feel they do not receive help rapidly enough.

Actions of formal actors

- Tallinn City Government declares local emergency
- The city, together with the Rescue Board (Päästeamet), Health Board (Terviseamet), Police and Border Guard Board, and utility operators, establishes a unified command structure to coordinate decision-making, information sharing, and resource allocation.
- Rescue Board and municipal authorities assess buildings affected by loss of heating, water, or sanitation and identify uninhabitable dwellings.
- City authorities issue regular, updated public communication on the situation, safety instructions, shelter locations, and service restoration timelines

- Authorities may order targeted or mass evacuation of unsafe buildings, particularly where cold exposure, hygiene risks, or fire hazards are present.
- The municipality coordinates evacuation transport, including accessible transport for people with mobility or care needs.
- Tallinn City Social Welfare Department (Sotsiaal- ja Tervishoiuamet) organises temporary accommodation, shelters, and social support - priority groups are older adults, people with disabilities, families with children
- Municipality coordinates evacuation transport
- Municipality social workers check on people in some people vulnerable conditions (e.g. elderly living alone, people with disabilities), provide information, material support, referrals to shelters or services
- Officially trained community volunteers available in Tallinn are integrated into the response under municipal coordination to support information dissemination, shelter operations, assistance to vulnerable residents.

Actions of the population and other informal actors

- Families need to leave their homes
- Some people refuse to leave their homes, distrust evacuation authorities.
- Residents carry physically disabled or elderly neighbours down stairwells.
- To get warmth, people start improvised fires in their homes
- Food and water are shared between neighbours
- Volunteers, both formal (Estonian Rescue Board, Women's Defence League and Tallinn city crisis volunteers) and informal volunteers distribute hot tea, blankets, clothing
- Some people organise outdoor kitchens, serving warm food and tea to their families; some serve also to other neighbouring community members.
- In some apartment blocks, inhabitants organise teams checking up on neighbours' conditions.
- Community leaders (e.g. apartment union heads) help calm tensions and confusion
- Some persons are frost-bitten.
- One person is missing, may have lost direction and is frost-bitten (may be seeking shelter in a shed, may get frozen).
- Alternative housing/sheltering is offered by inhabitants and companies in close-by areas

Stage 7: Longer-term recovery

Days to weeks after power restoration

Electricity is restored gradually over several days. Heating circulation resumes, but many buildings suffer burst pipes, water damage, and electrical faults. A big bulk of apartments remain uninhabitable for months.

Residents return in phases. Social services conduct welfare checks, particularly among elderly evacuees. Hospitals continue treating delayed complications from cold exposure. Psychological impacts become more visible as stress reactions emerge.

Central concerns

- Relatively weak local solidarity
- Difficulties in accessing relief and supplies.
- Due to earlier damages, drinking water and sewage are still not available.

Actions of formal actors

- Tallinn Municipal Police Department (Mupo) and Estonian Rescue Board assess building safety and structural hazards
- Elektrilevi/Elering work on restoring electricity distribution
- Tallinna Vesi works on restoring water and wastewater systems
- Infrastructure restoration timeline is provided however, delays occur
- Tallinn City Social Welfare Department (Sotsiaal- ja Tervishoiuamet) organises temporary accommodation, shelters, and social support
- Tallinn Social Welfare and Health Department, Social Insurance Board and crisis helplines provide mental health and social support

Actions of the population and other informal actors

- Skilled residents offer assistance with plumbing and electrical repairs
- In some apartment blocks, inhabitants organise teams checking up on neighbours' conditions
- Food and water are shared between neighbours
- Alternative housing/sheltering is offered by inhabitants and companies in close-by areas



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